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Résumé / abstract
This paper investigates whether inherited legacies such as legal origin allow of explaining 
deforestation in 110 developed and developing countries. The hypothesis is that differences 
in deforestation between countries can be attributed to their legal systems. Also, since nearly 
all common law countries are former English colonies, and nearly all civil law countries were 
colonized  by  France,  Spain  or  Portugal,  legal  origin  and  colonial  history  are  strongly 
correlated, so that one can not attribute all the variance to the effect of the legal system.  
What is found overall is that (i) French civil law countries deforest less than English common 
law ones within the total sample, within the sample of colonized countries, and within the 
sample of tropical developing countries; (ii) Former French colonies deforest less than former 
English colonies. These results hold when geography features are controlled for since the 
process of colonization was not random and depended on initial  geographic and climatic 
conditions.
Mots clés /Key words: Deforestation; Colonial legacies; Legal origin.
Codes JEL / JEL codes : Q12; Q24.
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1 Introduction
Recent empirical work shows that countries whose legal systems are based on French civil law
differ systematically from those whose legal systems are based on English common law. The
Legal Origin Theory of development, mainly developed by La Porta, Lopez-Silanes, Vishny
and Shleifer (LLSV—several papers La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2008)), investigates the role
of legal origin on law and regulation on economic performance. The style of a legal system
is influenced by political institutions (legal procedures,...), ideology, broader attitudes and phi-
losophy. These latter features rely on the historical background and the historical institutional
framework represented by the legal origin which is defined as “the style of social control on
economic life” (La Porta et al., 2008). The main assumption is that some national legal sys-
tems are sufficiently similar to others to allow a classification of national legal systems into
major families of law, though each country has a particular national legal system because each
country has experienced its own changes and its own local circumstances. Despite particular
adaptations, some fundamental legal features, shared by a group of countries, have persisted.
The Legal Origins Theory relies on three important conceptual ideas. First, by the eigh-
teenth or nineteenth centuries, Continental Europe, particularly France, and Great Britain had
developed separate styles of social control of economic activities as well as the underlying in-
stitutions supporting these styles. Second, both these styles and their legal institutions were
transplanted by the origin countries to most of the world through colonization, rather “than
written from scratch.” Third, despite country specific changes, these styles have persisted in
addressing the social control of economic life.
This way, this theory suggests that all law in a country is influenced by either the English
common law or else the French civil law. The first one originates in the laws of England and has
been transposed through conquest and colonization to England’s colonies, including the United
States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and many countries in Africa and Asia. The second
one originates in the Roman law. Rediscovered in the eleventh century by the Catholic Church,
the civil Roman law shaped the law in many European countries. However, the French civil law
developed at the beginning of the nineteenth century after the French Revolution with Napoleon
Bonaparte. This French law has been exported to many countries such as Spain, Portugal, Bel-
gium, Italy, and the Netherlands through Napoleon’s conquests. Moreover, the French civil
law has been transposed to many countries in the world through colonization and conquest by
France in the nineteenth century in Oceania, Indochina, Africa, and some Caribbean Islands.
Besides, the influence of French civil law has also been implemented in Latin South Ameri-
can countries in the nineteenth century after the independence of the Spanish and Portuguese
colonies. Finally, French civil law is now present in many South American, African and Asian
countries.
The Legal Origins Theory attributes a heavier role of government in the civil law coun-
tries compared with the common law ones. This difference is mainly attributed to historical
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differences between the two legal traditions (see Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) for a theoretical
presentation, and Klerman and Mahoney (2007) and Roe (2007) for a critical view of the Legal
Origin Theory). The French civil law had been developed to promote state control and to pre-
vent judges the opportunity for re-interpreting or changing laws. This marginalization of the
judiciary helped extend state control of the economy. In contrast, the English common law had
been created to protect private property and private freedom against the Crown. Thereby, a sys-
tem of decentralized law-making with an independent judiciary where judges could interpret
and change laws were implemented as effective checks on the government.
The consequences of these differing legal traditions on current economic performances have
been broadly studied. For instance, La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) investigates the link between
the law and finance. They show that the law in the civil law system has been designed to keep
investors poorly motivated and the stock market less developed, contrary to the common law’s
protecting and motivating investors. This paper highlights the crucial links between the legal
environment and finance, i.e., the nexus between legal institutions of the past and current eco-
nomic ones. Also, in several studies conducted by LLSV jointly with others, they found that
such outcomes as government ownership of banks (La Porta et al., 2002), the burden of entry
regulations (Djankov et al., 2002), regulation of labor markets (Botero et al., 2004), and gov-
ernment ownership of the media Djankov et al. (2003b) vary across legal families. They argue
that civil law is associated with more government ownership and regulation than common law.
This has adverse impacts on markets, such as greater corruption, a larger unofficial economy,
and higher unemployment. For instance, La Porta et al. (1999) studies such determinants of
political institutions as government performance (provision of public good, effectiveness, gov-
ernment spending). They highlight some political theories to explain the quality of government
and assume that legal origin can be a good proxy for these political theories. They argue that
the legal origin of law and regulation can predict “inefficient, interventionist and distortionary
policies.” They show that common law countries are less interventionist, better public good
suppliers, more efficient and democratic than civil law countries. Besides, in other studies, the
same authors have investigated the link between legal origin, property rights, and contract en-
forcement. For instance, Djankov et al. (2003a) have found that common law is less associated
with formalism of judicial procedures than French civil law. In another paper, La Porta et al.
(2004) have argued that common law countries enhance their judicial independence which is, in
turn, associated with more freedom, better contract enforcement, and greater security of prop-
erty rights1. In all, more than 100 papers have used legal origin as an explanatory variable, and
LLSV’s papers have been cited more than 2500 times. This paper contributes to that literature
by investigating the impact of legal origin on deforestation.
In this series of papers, LLSV and others have explained that legal origin is correlated with
1The seventeenth-century English revolutionary took control of the judiciary away from the Crown, and
marginalised the role of the judiciary to prevent it from doing anything other than apply the existing law. The
creation of laws and the administration of justice were then separated contrary to France. In this case, legislatures
make laws, and independent judges enforce them, without interference from the legislature or the executive.
5
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2011.20
a wide range of institutions and policies which could be expected to produce higher rates of de-
forestation such as corruption, mis-defined property rights, or a weak rule of law in French civil
law countries as opposed to common law ones. For this reason, the present paper investigates
the role of legal origin on deforestation assuming that the legal system matters in explaining de-
forestation. The main result is that civil law countries deforest significantly less than common
law countries. Nevertheless, the implementation of the each legal system is not exogenous,
except for previously colonized countries in which the legal system was transplanted by the
colonizer. The differential impact of the French civil law remains significant for the previously
colonized. Also, because of the close relationship between colonial history and legal origin, it
is difficult to attribute the differences in environmental performance to legal origin as opposed
to other aspects of colonial policy. In this sense, the differential impact of the the French civil
law could be attributed to French colonial legacies. Fortunately, not all previously colonized
countries with a French civil law inheritance were colonized by France, which allows of testing
a specific French difference. Former French colonies tend to deforest less than former British,
Spanish, or other colonies. This difference can be attributed to forest law legacies inherited
from the 1827 French Forestry Code. Finally, since colonization strategies were not random
and depended on geographical and climatic conditions, geographic features are controlled for.
These results remain significant and robust.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the dataset and variables used in
this paper. Section 3 presents the main results and checks for the role of colonial legacies as
well as geography. Section 4 provides concluding remarks and points to a interesting possible
extension of this study.
2 Data
The core dataset consists of 110 countries which had to meet one condition: having a French
civil law origin, a common law origin, or a German civil law origin. However, two other
different samples are used here to investigate more deeply the exogeneous role of legal origin
and the influence of colonial legacies. The first one is a core dataset of 70 countries which had to
meet two other conditions: (1) they are former colonies, (2) they are not located in Europe. The
first criterion ensures that legal origin was exogenous and the second one excludes European
countries to reflect the difficulty of classifying the colonial history of most European countries
such as Italy or Finland for instance. The second sample is a core dataset of 47 countries which
had to meet two other conditions: (1) being located in the tropics and (2) having a forest area
above one million hectares in 1990.
Table 9 describes the variables. Table 8 indicates which countries are in the core dataset of
110 countries as well as in the two other sub-samples. Deforestation rates have been calculated
from various Forest Resources Assessment (FRA) of the Food and Agriculture Organization
(FAO). Although forest area data are available since 1960, only data since 1990 is used here,
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given the lack of reliability of the data before the 1990-FRA. This way, the dependent variable
is the four-year average annual rate of deforestation on the sub-periods 1990–1993, 1994–1997,
1998–2001, and 2002–2005.
Legal origin was coded following two classifications. The first coding comes from LLSV’s
most recent coding (La Porta et al., 2008). The second is a revaluation of this coding in light
of a variety of sources2. This coding differs from LLSV’s coding for five countries which are
here classified as “mixed legal origin”3. This alternative coding represents hybrid legal systems
of the common and civil law whereas four countries were classified by LLSV as common
law and one, the Philippines, as civil law. This coding could have had a large effect on the
analysis, because all four classified common law countries had deforestation rates significantly
higher whereas the Philippines had lower rates than average4. Nevertheless, as discussed further
below, the main results remain valid even using LLSV’s coding.
The colonial origin variables are coded by the dominant colonial power in the period 1750–
2009. Though for most countries the coding was relatively straightforward, it was more compli-
cated where the country was colonized by multiple countries. In this latter case, the assumption
is that the last colonialist had had the biggest effect on institutional infrastructure at the time
of independence5. Four categories of formerly colonized countries are created: the groups are
the former colonies colonized by (i) France, (ii) England, (iii) Spanish and (iv) other countries
(Belgium, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, Portugal, and Spain, Japan or the U.S).
Table 1 shows that legal and colonial origin are highly correlated. First, all common law
countries are former British colonies whereas all former French colonies are of French legal
origin. Nevertheless, the correlation between legal and colonial origin is not perfect so that
some deviations could be exploited. For instance, all former Spanish colonies have French legal
origin countries. These heterogeneities help to investigate whether legal traditions or colonial
legacies have a greater influence on current deforestation in former colonized countries.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of deforestation rates between 1990–2005 along the
identity of the former colonizer6. As can be seen, countries with different legal systems and
colonial histories differ significantly in terms of deforestation performance. First, we see that
French civil law countries have deforested less between 1990–2005 than common law ones.
Second, the former French colonies have deforested less between 1990 and 2005 than the other
2Basically, the World Legal Systems Websites (http://www.droitcivil.uottawa.ca/world-legal-systems/eng-
monde.html) of the University of Ottawa, Canada, is examined.
3Four of these countries are former colonies: Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and South Africa. Also,
Thailand is classified as “mixed legal origin” and as a non-colonized country.
4For instance, the average deforestation rate was 0.03% in the core dataset and 0.05% in the sub-sample of
tropical countries. In contrast, the four common law countries had a mean deforestation rate of 0.08% whereas
the Philippines had a deforestation rate of -0.08%.
5Some countries were colonized by joining colonial powers, such as Cameroon, and were coded according to
the colonial power of the more populous part (French in the case of Cameroon).
6The sample used is of 65 countries formerly colonized by France, Great Britain, Spain or Portugal. The five
other former colonies, not presented but in the sample of colonized countries, are: the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Korea and Indonesia.
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former colonies7. These results seem to highlight that legal and colonial legacies could have
influenced some current features which, in turn, influence current deforestation.
3 Econometric Results
3.1 Main results
Table 3 presents the results of regressions using the core dataset of 110 countries as well as the
sample of 70 former colonies. In all regressions, the dependent variable is the four-year average
annual rate of deforestation on the sub-periods 1990–1993, 1994–1997, 1998–2001, and 2002–
2005. In the first two columns, the only independent variables are legal origin dummy variables
and the omitted category is that of French legal origin.
As in Table 2, common law countries deforest 0.4% more, on average, than French civil
law countries, and this difference is significant at the 1% level (column 1). This result holds in
only previously colonized countries in which the implementation of the legal system is more
exogenous (column 2)8. These countries tend to deforest 0.3% more than French civil law
countries.
The third column reports a regression with only colonial origin dummies as independent
variables on the sample of former colonies (the omitted category is French former colonies).
Former British colonies deforest 0.5% more than former French colonies, and this difference
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Since all former British colonies are common law
ones countries, this result does not allow of concluding about the role of legal origin or colonial
legacies on deforestation. In addition, former Spanish and other colonies deforest more than
former French colonies. This result is important, because all of these countries had received a
version of the French civil law from Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire, or
Portugal. Hence, since these former colonies deforest significantly more than former French
colonies, it is obvious that legal origin does not suffice to explain the effects of inherited legacies
on deforestation. This fact suggests that other aspects of colonial policy are likely to have been
more important than legal origin.
Column 4 presents the results of a regression with both legal and colonial origin on the
core dataset of 110 developed and developing countries. The coefficient on the common law
dummy remains significant whereas the coefficient on the former British colony variable is now
non-significant, although positive. These results seems to suggest that legal origin, not colonial
origin matters. Moreover, the coefficient of both former Spanish and other colonies remains
significantly positive. In this case, colonial origin seems to matter and some French colonial
legacies allow of reducing deforestation compared to Spanish colonial legacies for instance.
7However, the mean of deforestation in former French colonies is not statistically and significantly different
from that of the former Spanish colonies.
8Non colonized countries (included United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand) were excluded because
they are not former colonies so that their legal origin is not exogenous.
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Table 4 presents the same regressions and adds the five commonly used explanatory vari-
ables of deforestation9: the lag of forested areas, the log of GDP10, the rural population density,
the population growth and the relative price of timber (see Table 9 for more information). All
variables are four-year averages, the sub-periods being 1990–1993, 1994–1997, 1998–2001
and 2002–2005. The core dataset is reduced to 87 countries and the former colonies sample
regroups, now, only 61 countries. The previous results concerning the effect of legal and colo-
nial origins remain robust to the introduction of all these variables. All common law countries
(previously colonized countries) deforest 0.7% (0.08%) more than French civil law countries
between 1990 and 2005.
Table 5 replicates key regressions from Table 4 using the alternative coding. This coding
differs from LLSV’s coding and uses hybrid legal systems of the common and civil law for five
countries. The results remain identical to those in Table 4. Common law countries experience
deforestation rates higher than French civil law countries (0.7% higher), and that difference
remains significant when colonial origin is controlled for (column 3). Again, the coefficient on
the former British colony variable is positive but non-significant, suggesting that legal origin,
not colonial origin, mattered.
Finally, Table 6 replicates key regressions from Table 4 using the third sample of tropical
countries. The results remains identical to those in Table 4. Common law countries deforest
0.08% more than French civil law countries, and that difference remains significant when colo-
nial origin is controlled for (column 4). Again, the coefficient on the former British colony
variable is positive but non-significant, suggesting that legal origin, not colonial origin, mat-
tered in developing countries with a significant tropical forest.
3.2 The role of geography
The colonization was not randomly implemented by colonial powers. It was done in accord
with imperial aims and relative power which varied over time and between colonial powers
(Engerman and Sokoloff, 2000; Joireman, 2001; Lange, 2004).
To capture this feature, settler mortality data provided by Daron Acemoglu (Acemoglu
et al., 2001)11 is used. These figures give an indication of the extent to which a particular place
was suitable for European settlement. In that study, the authors argue that European colonizers
adopted different colonization strategies with correspondingly different institutions, depending
on the conditions in the colonies. They explain that the feasibility of European settlement,
characterized by the mortality rates of colonizers, determined the colonization strategy. More
precisely, the conditions in colonies (the disease environment and the density of population)
9The results do not change with other control variables such as corruption or the rule of law index provided by
ICRG or the World Bank (World Governance Indicators). Results available upon request.
10The introduction of the squared term of GDP to test the presence of the environmental Kuznets curve does
not change the results. Results available upon request.
11Acemoglu et al. (2001) provide data for sixty-two former colonies with the maximum settler mortality for
Mali.
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conditioned the European strategies. Besides they argue that institutions of the past have per-
sisted over time so that current effects of present institutions on economic development could
be explained by institutions of the past designed by Europeans in their colonies. They show
econometrically that former “extractive colonies” characterized by a high level of mortality
of settlers experienced bad institutions which impeded their current ones and so their level
of development. Unlike these extractive colonies, the “settler colonies” had good institutions
brought by the colonizer which have persisted over time, encouraging economic development
in these former colonies.
The fact is that Britain colonized all or nearly all the most favorable countries. A mean
comparison test shows that former French colonies had higher settler mortality compared to
former British colonies.
Moreover, the geographical position of each country could influence deforestation rates.
Also, French civil law countries are farther from the equator than common law countries. To
control for that, the geographic position (latitude) of each country is used, to be sure that the
results are not driven by the geographic location of the country12.
Table 7 reports the regressions concerning the effects of the settlers’ strategies and the lat-
itude. The dataset for the first three columns is only for former colonies for which settler
mortality data is available. This dataset, covering 54 countries, is slightly different than the
sample of former colonies used previously, of 70 countries13. The results concerning the su-
periority of French civil law compared to common law are identical. However, the positive
effect of former Spanish colonies becomes non-significant14. These results could suggest that
the initial superiority of the French colonial legacies are better attributed to colonial strategies.
Columns 4–7 add the control for the distance from the equator. The previous results per-
sist concerning the positive effect of common law origins, and Spanish colonial legacies on
deforestation.
4 Conclusion
Recent empirical work demonstrates that countries whose legal systems are based on French
civil law differ systematically from those whose legal systems are based on English civil law.
The hypothesis of this paper was that differences in the legal system can explain differences in
environmental performance, measured through the loss of forest area between 1990 and 2005.
The main result of this paper is that French civil law countries deforest significantly less
12The literature of the role of geography on economic development is substantial. See for instance Engerman
et al. (2002) and Easterly and Levine (2003).
13Given that all countries are previously colonized ones, in the third column with both legal and colonial origin,
the former British colonies variable dummy has been removed because of its collinearity with the common law
dummy variable.
14The sole Spanish colony removed is Equatorial Guinea, whereas none of the former French colonies have
been removed. Thus, the results are not driven by a change in the sample.
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than English common law countries. This result is robust in all samples and with the com-
monly used explanatory variables of deforestation. This result is particularly significant for the
sample of previously colonized countries for whom the legal system is mainly an exogenous
feature, and of developing countries with a substantial tropical forest. Also, since the choice of
colonization strategy was not random, geographical features were controlled for. These results
remain significantly robust. Also, former French colonies deforest less than former British
colonies, though this result does not persist when legal origin is controlled for. Thus legal
origin, not colonial origin, matters for explaining the loss of forest area. Also, former French
colonies deforest less than other former colonies in the civil law area, such as formerly Span-
ish colonies. These results suggest that more than the legal origin on law and regulation, some
French colonial legacies have reduced deforestation in the developing countries which had been
colonized by France15.
As a conclusion, it is worth noting that the French civil law seems to matter in reducing de-
forestation in previously colonized countries, by comparison with English common law. This
study highlights the superiority of the French civil law over the English common law in pre-
serving forested areas in developing countries. Moreover, because of the close relationship
between colonial history and legal origin, it is difficult to attribute the differences in environ-
mental performance to legal origin as opposed to other aspects of colonial policy. Anyway, one
can attribute this effect of the French civil law on deforestation to French colonial or legal lega-
cies such as the forest law legacies inherited from the French Forestry Code of 1827. This result
is confirmed by the fact that former French colonies tend to deforest less than former British
colonies, reinforcing the hypothesis on the presence of French forest law legacies which is both
a colonial origin and a legal origin.
This research can be extended to try to explain more precisely the differential impact of the
French civil law. Another way to extend this article is to analyze whether English common
law could, in such cases, allow of reducing deforestation since common law is associated to
less corruption, better rule of law, and well defined property rights, all associated with low
levels of deforestation. In this sense, legal origin could condition the effect of the institutional
background on deforestation.
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Tables
Table 1: Former colonial status and legal origin
French Common German Total
civil law law civil law
Non-colonized countries 19 8 13 40
Former French colonies 18 0 0 18
Former British colonies 0 25 0 25
Former Spanish colonies 16 0 0 16
Former other colonies 10 0 1 11
Total 63 33 14 110
Table 2: Legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation rate (1990–2005)
Core dataset (110 countries)
Legal origin French Common German
0.0022 0.0073∗∗∗ - 0.0025∗∗∗
Number of countries 63 33 14
Only previously colonized countries (65 countries)
Colonial power French British Spanish Portuguese
0.0034 0.0091∗∗∗ 0.0051 0.0070∗
Number of countries 18 25 16 6
Asterisks indicate results of t-tests. The null hypothesis is that the mean is the
same as the mean for French legal origin countries/Former French colonies.
*** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical
significance at 10%.
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Table 3: Legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation (1990–2005)
Dependent variable: Rate of deforestation
Legal origin Legal origin Colonial origin Both
All sample Previously Colonized Previously Colonized All sample
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Common law 0.004∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
German civil law 0.0005 0.006∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Former British colonies 0.005∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.001)
Former Spanish colonies 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Former other colonies 0.004∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.002 0.005∗ 0.004 0.0008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 436 278 278 436
Countries 110 70 70 110
Adjusted R2 0.26 0.092 0.108 0.278
F statistic 33.358 26.002 12.912 26.071
Note: OLS robust standard errors in parentheses. In all regressions, regional and year dummies are
introduced (omitted region is Asia). The omitted category is French legal origin, and/or Former French
colony. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at
10%.
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Table 4: Control variables, legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation (1990–2005)
Dependent variable: Rate of deforestation
Legal origin Legal origin Colonial origin Both
All sample Previously Colonized Previously Colonized All sample
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Common law 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
German civil law 0.005∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Former British colonies 0.008∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.002)
Former Spanish colonies 0.004 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Former other colonies 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.002)
Lag forest Area 0.0002 -.00003 -.0002 0.00002
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0006)
Log GDP -.003∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Rural density -1.71e-06 -4.54e-06∗ -3.58e-06 -2.48e-06
(1.86e-06) (2.37e-06) (2.27e-06) (1.96e-06)
Pop. growth 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Timber 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.005
(0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007)
Observations 348 244 244 348
Countries 87 61 61 87
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.24 0.236 0.35
F statistic 18.217 12.696 8.191 15.557
Note: OLS robust standard errors in parentheses. In all regressions, regional and year dummies are
introduced (omitted region is Asia). The omitted category is French legal origin, and/or Former French
colony. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at
10%.
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Table 5: Alternative coding: Legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation (1990–2005)
Dependent variable: Rate of deforestation
Legal origin Legal origin Both
All sample Previously Colonized All sample
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)
Common law 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Mixed legal origin 0.018∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
German civil law 0.007∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Former British colonies 0.002
(0.002)
Former Spanish colonies 0.003
(0.003)
Former other colonies 0.003
(0.002)
Lag Forest Area 0.0005 0.0004 0.0004
(0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0005)
Log GDP -.003∗∗∗ -.003∗∗∗ -.003∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006)
Rural density -1.99e-06 -5.43e-06∗∗∗ -2.49e-06
(1.54e-06) (1.81e-06) (1.67e-06)
Pop. growth 0.006∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Timber 0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant 0.0002 0.003 0.0004
(0.007) (0.01) (0.007)
Observations 348 244 348
Countries 87 61 87
Adjusted R2 0.409 0.326 0.408
F statistic 18.685 12.879 15.78
Note: OLS robust standard errors in parentheses. In all regressions, regional and
year dummies are introduced (omitted region is Asia). The omitted category is
French legal origin, and/or Former French colony. *** statistical significance at
1%, ** statistical significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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Table 6: Tropical countries: Legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation (1990–2005)
Dependent variable: Rate of deforestation
Legal origin Legal origin Colonial origin Both
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4)
Common law 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
German civil law -.012∗∗∗ -.004
(0.004) (0.004)
Former British colonies 0.011∗∗∗ 0.003
(0.002) (0.003)
Former Spanish colonies 0.003 0.003
(0.004) (0.004)
Former other colonies 0.014∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003)
Lag Forest Area -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗ -.004∗∗∗
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Log GDP -.001∗ -.001 -.001 -.001
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008)
Rural density -5.68e-06∗∗∗ -6.57e-06∗∗∗ -6.63e-06∗∗∗ -6.57e-06∗∗∗
(1.66e-06) (2.02e-06) (1.81e-06) (1.81e-06)
Pop. growth 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗ 0.003∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Timber -.001 -.0006 -.001 -.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Constant 0.032∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.011) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 176 168 168 176
Countries 44 42 42 44
Adjusted R2 0.253 0.164 0.301 0.375
F statistic 18.568 5.361 7.806 17.549
Note: OLS robust standard errors in parentheses. In all regressions, regional and year
dummies are introduced (omitted region is Asia). The omitted category is French legal
origin, and/or Former French colony. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical
significance at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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Table 7: Geography, legal origin, colonial origin, and deforestation (1990–2005)
Dependent variable: Rate of deforestation
Legal Colonial Both Legal Legal Colonial Both
Origin Origin Origins Origin Origin Origin Origins
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Common law 0.01∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
German civil law 0.011∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Former British colonies 0.011∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Former Spanish colonies 0.002 0.003 0.005∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Former other colonies 0.004 0.005∗ 0.004∗ 0.005∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Lag Forest Area 0.0003 -1.00e-05 -.0001 0.0002 -.0004 -.0005 0.00006
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0006)
Log GDP -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗ -.002∗∗ -.003∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗ -.002∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0005)
Rural density -4.22e-06 -4.24e-06 -4.79e-06∗ -2.94e-06 -7.03e-06∗∗∗ -5.06e-06∗∗ -3.51e-06∗
(2.67e-06) (2.71e-06) (2.71e-06) (1.86e-06) (2.36e-06) (2.22e-06) (1.94e-06)
Pop. growth 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Timber 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Log settler mortality 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Latitude -.009 -.020∗∗∗ -.014∗∗ -.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Constant -.013 -.018 -.013 0.007 0.015 0.011 0.007
(0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.006) (0.01) (0.011) (0.007)
Observations 216 216 216 348 244 244 348
Countries 54 54 54 87 61 61 87
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.294 0.301 0.345 0.258 0.243 0.353
F statistic 10.875 7.501 9.946 16.31 11.443 7.038 14.275
Note: Columns 1 to 3 (4 to 6) report the results with settlers mortality (latitude) as control variable. OLS robust standard
errors in parentheses. In all regressions, regional and year dummies are introduced (omitted region is Asia). The omitted
category is French legal origin, and/or Former French colony. *** statistical significance at 1%, ** statistical significance
at 5%, * statistical significance at 10%.
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Table 8: List of Countries
Core Dataset of 110 Countries
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Democratic Rep.
Congo, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Equatorial
Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Gabon, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea,
Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, South
Korea, Laos, Latvia, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia,
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua
New, Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia,
Sierra Leone, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname,
Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
70 Past Colonized Countries
Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cen-
tral African Rep., Chad, Chile, Colombia, Democratic Rep. Congo, Congo Rep., Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Do-
minican Rep., Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, South Korea, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali,
Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New
Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Tanzania, Uganda, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
47 Tropical Countries
Angola, Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile,
China, Colombia, Democratic Rep. Congo, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana,
Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Laos, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mozambique, Nepal,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
Table 9: Data Descriptions and Sources
Code Variables and Definition Source
Deforest Deforestation: Log forested areas in t− 1 minus log forested areas in t. FAO
Log(Forestt−1) Initial Forest Areas: Log forested areas in t− 1. FAO
GDP Log GDP per capita, constant 2000 US$. WDI 2008
Popgr Annual population growth rate (percentage). WDI 2008
Rural Rural population density per km2 of arable land. WDI 2008
Timber The relative price of timber. FAO/WDI 2008
Legalor Legal origin of law and regulation with common, French civil law, German and
Scandinavian law.
(La Porta et al., 2008)
Colony Colonial dummies indicating whether a country had been a British, French,
Spanish, or other (German, Italian, Belgian, Dutch or Portuguese) colony.
(La Porta et al., 1999)
Mortality Log of the fourth mortality estimated by Acemoglu et al. (2000, Appendix,
Table A2).
(Acemoglu et al., 2001)
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